Lawmaker Proposes Reviving 'Letters of Marque' to Authorize Private Cyber Operators Against Scam Networks
Rep. David Schweikert has introduced legislation that would revive a long‑disused constitutional power to commission private actors to act against foreign cybercriminal enterprises. The measure, filed in August 2025 as the Cybercrime Marque and Reprisal Authorization Act, would authorize the executive branch to grant limited commissions to licensed private cyber operators to pursue and disrupt overseas scam syndicates.
Under the proposal, the revived mechanism — often described as a modern form of "letters of marque" — would permit the President to deputize privately contracted individuals or firms to recover stolen property, intervene against criminal infrastructure, and take other actions the government deems necessary to stop threats originating abroad. Supporters say the tool adapts an historical wartime mechanism to the digital age.
The bill identifies a wide range of targetable conduct, including large‑scale cryptocurrency theft, ransomware operations, impersonation and identity‑theft schemes, so‑called "pig butchering" romance‑fraud networks, unauthorized access to computer systems, and online trafficking in credentials. Provisions discussed in coverage and the sponsor’s materials would aim to enable asset recovery and disruption of the criminal enterprises behind those schemes.
Backers frame the move against a backdrop of significant crypto and cyber losses in 2025, pointing to high‑profile intrusions attributed to state‑linked actors and organized groups that have resulted in large monetary drains from platforms and victims. Proponents argue current tools are insufficient to reach operators hiding in hostile or uncooperative jurisdictions.
Legal scholars and policy analysts, however, have warned that reinstating such commissions poses serious legal, diplomatic and strategic risks. Critics say authorizing private actors to pursue or seize foreign assets could blur the line between lawful enforcement and extraterritorial aggression, risk misidentification of targets, and provoke retaliation or escalation with foreign states. These objections emphasize historical lessons about privateering and modern concerns about accountability and international law.
As introduced, the measure must clear committee review and both chambers of Congress before it could become law; its progress will determine whether the United States pursues a constitutional‑historic route to address cross‑border cybercrime or opts for other policy and enforcement responses.
